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Abstract
The events of September 11th, 2001, brought the issue of transportation security and 
terrorism to the forefront of civil society. Transit security is especially challenging 
because of the nature of transit systems as open and accessible public places and 
the need to keep these systems running quickly and eﬃciently; transit oﬃcials cannot 
employ many of the security strategies used in aviation security. This paper examines 
the recent developments in transit security planning in the U.S. using two sources of 
data: 1) interviews with oﬃcials from federal agencies, a national transit industry 
organization, and local transit agencies, and 2) a nationwide survey of transit opera-
tors. The ﬁndings show that transit security remains a major concern for operators 
who must work to balance security needs with operations and management goals. 
Interagency coordination has become a crucial element of security planning. In addi-
tion, environmental design and public outreach and education—two strategies that 
received much less attention pre-September 11th—have emerged as much more 
important in transit security planning. 
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(CNN) – U.S. mass transit systems were put on higher alert after Thursday’s 
bombings in London, with oﬃcials in major cities urging Americans to go 
about their business but be on the lookout for anything suspicious…. New 
York Police Commissioner Ray Kelly told CNN his oﬃcers were “doing 
everything that’s prudent, everything that we reasonably can do to pro-
tect the city.” But he said it was impossible to put a police oﬃcer “on every 
train all the time, or one on every station all the time.” [http://www.cnn.
com/2005/US/07/07/us.response/; posted Thursday, July 17, 2005, 11:41 pm 
EDT (03:41 GMT)]
Overview
The events of September 11th, 2001, brought the issue of transportation security 
and terrorism to the forefront of civil society. Subsequent attacks—on subways in 
Moscow and Madrid and, more recently, on the Underground and bus networks of 
London—have further highlighted terrorism as a global threat with public transit 
systems as primary targets. While transportation security oﬃcials have long been 
aware of the possible threat of terrorist attacks on transportation networks, these 
tragic events revealed both vulnerabilities in security systems and the unimagi-
nable consequences of such breaches. Public surface transportation systems are, in 
general, easy and eﬀective targets for terrorists; this fact is reﬂected in the relatively 
signiﬁcant proportion of attacks occurring on these systems. In 1991, transporta-
tion systems were the target of 20 percent of all violent attacks. This rose to almost 
40 percent in 1998 (Boyd and Sullivan 2000). In addition, an examination of the 
public system targets and tactics used worldwide by terrorists from 1920 to 2000 
shows that the largest percentage (46%) of terrorist attacks against public surface 
transportation systems was carried out on subways and trains, subway and train 
stations, and rail (Jenkins 2001). 
The vulnerability of public transit systems lies in the fact that they are very open 
and accessible, with ﬁxed, predictable routes and access points. Their openness 
and anonymity make it easy for potential terrorists to hide in crowds without 
arousing suspicion. Securing such open and public systems presents transit and 
security oﬃcials with daunting challenges. The volume of passengers makes it 
impossible for transit operators to employ the types of security tactics used in 
commercial aviation. Closed system security measures, such as the screening of 
passengers and luggage with X-ray machines and metal detectors, hand searches, 
passenger proﬁling, dog sniﬀers, armed guards, and the like, would lead to intoler-
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able delays and costs (Balog, Devost, and Sullivan 2002; Jenkins 1997; Boyd and 
Sullivan 1997).
Attractive, convenient public transit systems help to mitigate many of the prob-
lems of widespread auto use and provide mobility for those who do not have 
regular access to automobiles, including youth, the elderly, the disabled, and poor 
people. Security measures that cause inconvenience, delay, or added cost to travel 
by public transit are likely to shift travelers and cities toward greater dependence 
on private vehicles. Given that many transit systems around the U.S. struggle 
to control costs, maintain a market share of metropolitan trips, and secure and 
maintain stable sources of public subsidy, security measures that diminish the 
accessibility, convenience, and/or aﬀordability of transit service conceivably could 
threaten the viability of public transit in many places. On the other hand, security 
measures that serve to increase the general safety, attractiveness, and reliability 
of transit systems without seriously compromising their accessibility are likely to 
enhance the attractiveness of public transit to potential riders (United States Gen-
eral Accounting Oﬃce 2002). Thus, while policing, surveillance, and emergency 
response will likely remain central to transit security planning, weaving security 
planning into transit system design and operations in ways that increase the safety 
and attractiveness of transit service oﬀers potentially signiﬁcant beneﬁts to transit 
systems and their customers.
This Study
While most decisions about transit services (routing, headways, fares, etc.) are 
entirely local, security planning requires transit agencies to work closely with 
local law enforcement as well as federal transportation and security oﬃcials. Such 
ongoing inter-governmental collaboration, particularly with federal security oﬃ-
cials, is new territory for many transit managers. This paper examines the fruits of 
this collaboration since September 11th, with a particular focus on how security 
considerations are being incorporated into the planning, design, and operations 
of U.S. transit systems.
Our data for this analysis are drawn from two sources. The ﬁrst is interviews con-
ducted either face-to-face or by telephone with oﬃcials from a number of federal 
and transit agencies and a transit industry organization; each interview lasted 
approximately one hour and involved an open-ended question format. At the 
federal level, we spoke with oﬃcials from the Department of Homeland Security 
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(DHS), the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), the Federal Transit 
Administration (FTA), and the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA).  We also 
conducted interviews with representatives from the American Public Transpor-
tation Association (APTA) and senior staﬀ with several major transit operators, 
including the New York Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA), Amtrak, 
and two other transit agencies that asked to remain anonymous. The geographic 
focus of these interviews was the northeastern U.S. We selected this region for 
three reasons. First, the cities of the northeastern U.S., and in particular the New 
York metropolitan area, are home to, by far, the largest and most heavily patron-
ized networks of public transit systems in the country; metropolitan New York 
alone accounted for 39 percent of all transit trips taken in the entire U.S. in 2002 
(American Public Transportation Association 2004). Second, while the venue of 
the September 11th attacks was the air transport system, their eﬀect on New 
York’s, and, to a lesser extent, Washington’s, public transit systems was dramatic 
and long-lasting and profoundly tested the ability of transit staﬀ in these two 
cities to respond to a major crisis. Finally, as the seat of the national government, 
most federal transit and transportation security oﬃcials are in the Washington, 
D.C. area. 
Where appropriate, the ﬁndings from these interviews are supplemented with the 
results of a 2004 nationwide survey of all 259 U.S. transit agencies that (according 
to the National Transit Database maintained by the Federal Transit Administra-
tion) operate at least 50 vehicles in peak period service. The letter to each general 
manager asked her/him to designate the appropriate person or persons to com-
plete an on-line survey. All told, respondents from 113 transit agencies completed 
survey questions, for a 44 percent response rate.1 This survey follows two earlier 
surveys of transit operators: 1) a survey of 42 transit managers that took place sev-
eral years before September 11th (Boyd and Sullivan 1997) and 2) a United States 
General Accounting Oﬃce (GAO) study conducted soon after September 11th 
that included a survey in 2002 of oﬃcials at 155 U.S. transit agencies (2002). This 
latter survey-based report considered the roles the federal government should 
play in helping public transit operators reduce both the likelihood and impacts of 
terrorist attacks on U.S. transit systems.
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Findings 
Despite nearly four years of relative quiet, most transit agency secu-
rity staff remain extremely concerned about the possibility of transit 
terrorism on their systems.
Chief John O’Connor of the Amtrak Police Department at Penn Station believes 
that the threat of terrorism on transit systems is “very real and that it is a question 
of when rather than if.” For O’Connor, September 11th was a galvanizing force, 
but it had started to fade somewhat in the mind’s eye of the public. The events in 
Madrid in March 2004, however, brought the issue of transportation security back 
to the forefront and, according to O’Connor, “now for most transit agencies it’s 
one of their top priorities, if not the top.” Oﬃcials are especially concerned about 
the negative publicity transit has received as a high-proﬁle terrorist target after the 
recent attacks in Moscow, Madrid, and London. Attention is increasingly focused 
on rail systems and major stations, such as Penn Station and Grand Central Sta-
tion. These large multimodal facilities and landmarks are considered potential 
targets of particular concern.
Indeed, respondents to our nationwide survey believed heavy (80%), commuter 
(63%), and light rail (60%) to be “very vulnerable” to future attack, while less that 
half believed bus service (45%), paratransit service (26%), and ferry service (22%) 
to be very vulnerable. With respect to transit system components, tracks and lines 
(66%) and stations (63%) were most likely to be identiﬁed as “very vulnerable.”
Greg Hull is Director of Operations, Safety, and Security Programs for the Ameri-
can Public Transportation Association (APTA), a transit industry organization 
with a membership of over 1,500 transit agencies and business representatives 
from across the U.S. In terms of understanding the transit terrorism threat at the 
local level, he acknowledges that perspectives on the level of risk and threat vary 
widely. However, he argues that the threat is pervasive regardless of whether the 
transit system is located in a large metropolitan area or a small one:
Some of us might argue that it doesn’t matter where you are. I mean, look at 
Oklahoma City. This isn’t just Al Queda we’re dealing with. There are domestic 
terrorists, there are people who have political missions, there are people who 
are wackos, there are people who are copycats, and so it doesn’t matter, from 
my perspective, it doesn’t matter where you are located, whether in Pocatello, 
Idaho, or Washington, D.C…. It doesn’t matter what city you live in or what 
town you live in, there is a need to address these issues.
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Hull also asserts that agencies need to address requirements in all modes–from 
subways to buses–contending that transit terrorism is not conﬁned to the largest 
population centers. However, he acknowledges that, practically and realistically, 
when making decisions about security using a risk management approach, local 
agencies do consider large numbers of people to pose the greatest vulnerabilities.
Increased intra-agency coordination is important in transit security 
planning and interagency coordination at the national and interna-
tional levels is crucial.
Several interviewees noted the importance of having management, planning, and 
operations personnel work hand-in-hand with police and security staﬀ to both 
minimize security-related service disruptions and to avoid having such disruptions 
become safety hazards in their own right. Said one interviewee,
As the security people come up with ideas that may not ﬁt, if you have operat-
ing people sitting there, that’s better. We have to reach some sort of a balance, 
some sort of a medium. How do we stop trains, how do we do inspections, but 
weave it into the regular fabric of our operations so our customers hardly notice? 
If we have a suspicious package, what is the procedure to deal with it? We try to 
minimize the delay to the train while still answering the concern, because when 
you start delaying trains, you create another safety problem as more trains get 
backed up. Now you’re creating a service disruption. In Penn Station or Grand 
Central, many of the subway stations where they have such volumes, just delay-
ing a train or two, you can lose a station. We end up having to shut down things. 
And then you get thousands and thousands of people in a panic situation won-
dering, “What’s going on? Why am I being evacuated?” Once you can’t run trains, 
you can’t let people into the station because you have a crush load.
FTA’s assistance to local transit agencies is aimed at trying to standardize practices 
and provide support such that the agencies are prepared and can share informa-
tion among themselves. The goal is to identify best practices and their dissemina-
tion to other agencies in similar circumstances. A high level of interagency coop-
eration already has been established in some places; transit security oﬃcials in 
New York describe a signiﬁcant amount of coordination not just in the New York 
area, but in the Northeast corridor more generally. O’Connor of Amtrak says that 
his agency deals with the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA) 
in Boston, the Connecticut Department of Transportation, the Long Island Rail-
road, New Jersey Transit, the Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Agency 
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(SEPTA), and the Maryland Rail Commuter (MARC). Some of these agencies have 
their own police departments, while others do not; some agencies provide security 
services for other transit systems. In a place such as Penn Station, there is a multi-
jurisdictional structure where the station is owned by Amtrak, which patrols the 
majority of the facility. Long Island Railroad leases a portion of the station and the 
New York MTA police patrol the lower level. Finally, the street level and subway 
entrances are policed by the New York Police Department (NYPD). Coordination 
among these policing and transit agencies becomes imperative.
Hull also emphasized that agency coordination and the dissemination of informa-
tion are crucial. Very few people in the transit industry, even among the police 
forces, have security clearances. According to Hull, after September 11th, APTA 
realized that the transit industry and federal transportation agencies needed to 
access security intelligence information. Transit agencies in major cities had good 
working relationships with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) through 
established joint terrorism task forces. However, this was not the case across the 
board. The U.S. Department of Transportation (USDOT) designated APTA a sector 
coordinator for the establishment of a Public Transit Information Sharing Analysis 
Center (PT-ISAC), part of the larger umbrella Surface Transportation ISAC. In this 
role, APTA has served as the primary contact for organizing public transportation 
agencies around security issues. APTA worked on this PT-ISAC project through an 
FTA grant. Hull says that APTA used the grant to contract with a company based 
in Virginia:
They have on staﬀ those people who have backgrounds, past careers with the FBI 
and Department of Defense. They have top-level security clearances. And they 
are able to glean through sources of information and package it in a manner 
that’s meaningful to the transit industry. We are now in the process of connect-
ing all transit agencies within this ISAC to be able to access this information.
Hull related that the ﬂow of information is from the ISAC out to transit agencies, 
but there is also a push to have agencies input their own information into the 
intelligence system: “If an agency experiences a certain degree of trespassing, they 
might see that as kids getting into the train yards or something. But maybe it’s 
part of something that’s more of a trend in the industry and that becomes good 
information that needs to be analyzed and disseminated out to the industry.”
Hull says the direct exchange of information among agencies is also a priority for 
APTA and something it helps facilitate:
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We get the permission of the transit agencies to share whatever the best prac-
tice might be. It might be something like preventive maintenance, it might be a 
design concept in a facility, it might be the way that staﬀ are utilized for safety 
and security. Our industry has historically and continues to be very supportive 
of one another. One of the things that has occurred is that where prior to 9/11 
we saw more agencies more willing to share their security plans, now that’s a 
little more closely guarded. They may share those plans with one another, but it 
would be eye-to-eye and hand-to-hand as opposed to what we may have seen 
in prior years. But there’s a very, very open sharing of information within the 
system.
In addition, APTA has actively engaged individuals in various federal agencies 
working on security issues, particularly DHS and TSA, in order to educate them 
about public transit. According to Hull, APTA has used a Transit 101 presentation 
with the message that the organization—not the federal government—has the 
real expertise in transit. APTA involves the transit industry in all important stages 
of planning:
They [the federal government] may have the expertise in terms of security 
development for certain perspectives and certainly they have the funds and 
the legislative mandate. But the bottom line is that if there are any directions 
or mandates to the transit industry.… the only way that those things can be 
successful is by engaging us at a very early stage so that the industry can have 
proper buy-in and actually have a hand in the development of any such stan-
dards that might come forward.
Hull understands that transit security is happening in an international context. 
As such, the organization has formal partnerships with other transit industry 
groups around the world: the Canadian Urban Transit Association, the Interna-
tional Association of Public Transport (UITP, with headquarters in Brussels), the 
Latin-American Association of Underground Networks and Subways (ALAMYS), 
and the Cooperation for the Continuing Development of Urban and Suburban 
Transportation (CODATU), based in Paris and representing transit systems in 
developing nations. A couple of years ago, APTA invited these associations and 
some of their primary agency members to meet with them in Washington. The 
goal was to share information about program development and relationships 
with government agencies. APTA representatives continue to share information 
with these other groups and they invite each other to special conferences and 
workshops on security. 
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Balancing the security of their systems with other operations and 
management objectives is a central dilemma for many transit man-
agers. 
Particular security strategies, like inspecting passenger bags or employing explo-
sives detection technologies, pose enormous challengers to transit systems 
that depend on operating as quickly and reliably as possible. Some oﬃcials, like 
Amtrak’s O’Connor, are sanguine that improved security and eﬃcient opera-
tions can be eﬀectively integrated to bolster ridership: “If people do not feel safe 
and secure, they won’t use the system. They’ll avoid it if possible. If you allow the 
system to fall into disorder and decay, it will deﬁnitely aﬀect your ridership.” Thus, 
operators are aware that weighing the costs and beneﬁts of system security overall, 
as well as of particular measures, is a complex process and includes variables that 
can be diﬃcult to quantify. An overwhelming majority (87%) of the respondents 
to our nationwide survey of transit operators reported that anti-terrorism eﬀorts 
were either fully (46%) or partially (41%) congruent with anti-crime eﬀorts.
Amtrak’s O’Connor believes that all security strategies are important, and the 
distinction is between short term and longer term strategies: 
On a day to day basis, your focus is on operations, police deployment, both pre-
vention and response. Long term, you need to set goals and design activities to 
help achieve those goals. You need to plan long term capital improvement that 
will help you achieve those goals. And you have to constantly—daily, weekly, 
quarterly, yearly—measure the eﬀectiveness of your strategies and tactics to see 
if they are in fact achieving those goals.
Threat and vulnerability assessments are one important tool to help security 
officials weigh their different options, and, in fact, 80 percent of our survey 
respondents reported that they conducted the most recent threat and vulner-
ability assessment at their agencies to identify eﬀective security technology and 
procedures. These assessments are also quite common. Eighty-ﬁve percent of the 
113 agencies surveyed nationwide indicated that they have conducted some level 
of threat and vulnerability assessment; agencies with rail were much more likely 
to conduct a comprehensive assessment than other agencies. This is a signiﬁcant 
increase over the 54 percent reported by respondents to the 2002 GAO survey 
(United States General Accounting Oﬃce 2002). 
Survey respondents were asked to describe other ways their agencies have 
attempted to identify and assess security vulnerabilities in the transit system. 
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Methods identiﬁed most frequently were constant monitoring of crime statistics, 
periodic reviews/discussions of security by employees, daily visual checks/obser-
vations, employee and customer feedback, and regular contact with local law 
enforcement agencies. Many agencies reported having an internal security com-
mittee that meets on a regular basis to discuss and monitor security. One agency 
reported an active Transit Watch program, which solicits the participation of 
customers to point out vulnerabilities. 
The perceived relevance of environmental design as a security strat-
egy increased signiﬁcantly after September 11th.
All of the transit oﬃcials interviewed for this research believe that design ele-
ments are central to security planning and should be explicitly addressed dur-
ing the design and construction of facilities. Said one interviewee, “We’ve now 
incorporated security in the designs and boilerplates. Whereas at one time if you 
were going to construct a station, you would have only had to do safety—ﬁre 
suppression, ﬁre and life safety, ventilation, lighting, ﬁre alarms. But now there’s a 
security piece that gets incorporated.” Several of those interviewed suggested that, 
by including security as an integral part of the design process, transit agencies can 
avoid costly and sometimes problematic station retroﬁts and redesigns.
The oﬃcials interviewed reported implementing other, less expensive environ-
mental design strategies since September 11th, including removing trash cans, 
locking down seats in rail cars, taking out recessed telephones, eliminating nooks 
and crannies at stops and in stations, and installing access controls on all doors. 
Such strategies—both elaborate and simple—often are grouped under the rubric 
of “crime prevention through environmental design,” or CPTED. Among the 113 
respondents to our nationwide survey of large and medium-sized transit opera-
tors, 58 percent reported that their agency now makes moderate or extensive use 
of CPTED strategies. About half (49%) of bus-only agencies reported using CPTED 
strategies; among transit agencies operating one or more rail modes, which are 
far more likely to include enclosed stations, the ﬁgure was closer to 9 out of 10 
(88%). 
While extensive design retroﬁts for existing stations would be costly, certain 
design schemes means can be utilized to enhance security. Amtrak’s O’Connor 
says that, after September 11th, his agency took several steps to put environmen-
tal design features into place. At the major stations, barricades and CCTV systems 
were installed without making major renovations to any of the stations. O’Connor 
pointed to the Washington, D.C. Metro system as one of the best in terms of 
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security-oriented environmental design, with its clear sight lines and relatively 
few nooks and crannies. With respect to the future, O’Connor suggests that inter-
city transportation agencies will have to consider creating “secure zones,” where 
people are screened and their bags checked before they enter boarding areas. He 
acknowledges, however, that this type of system is diﬃcult to implement in intra-
city transit environments where very large numbers of people make relatively 
short trips.
Most transit ofﬁcials believe that passenger outreach and awareness 
strategies are important.
Many transit systems internationally—such as the Underground subway system 
in London—have actively sought to enlist the help of patrons in watching for and 
reporting suspicious activity. William Morange, Executive Director for Security 
at the New York MTA, believes that rider and employee awareness is the most 
eﬀective transit security strategy. He notes that the Executive Director of New 
York MTA put an “if you see something, say something” program in place before 
September 11th, “where if you see something that’s not kosher—the way it should 
look—report it to the conductors, report it to the motormen. . . Now calls are 
going up, but it’s worth it for us.” 
APTA’s Hull says that there are “tools that enhance security and we certainly 
see more of the transit agencies moving towards introducing a variety of tech-
nologies,” but he emphasizes two particular security strategies: (1) training and (2) 
emergency preparedness drills. The former includes the formal training of transit 
staﬀ, but also outreach to transit customers—“the whole concept of having a 
broad network of eyes and ears and voices that will look for and let us know when 
they see something that just doesn’t seem right.”
When asked about information and outreach strategies to educate transit riders 
about general emergency and safety issues, three-quarters of those surveyed from 
rail systems report having such programs in place, and 90 percent of these include 
speciﬁc strategies to educate transit riders about dealing with terrorist attacks. 
In addition, while fewer than 30 percent of respondents to our national survey 
of transit operators perceived public education and user outreach as “central” 
or “signiﬁcant” to increasing transit security prior to September 11th, this ﬁgure 
jumped to over 60 percent after September 11th.
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Conclusions 
In this paper we have examined, through both in-depth interviews and responses 
to a national survey, eﬀorts of federal agencies and national organizations in the 
U.S. and transit operators (primarily in the large cities of the northeastern U.S.) 
to maintain and enhance the security of local rail transit system design and envi-
ronments. Our ﬁndings show that transit security has emerged as a signiﬁcant 
concern for transit operators, especially after recent terrorist attacks on systems 
in Madrid, Moscow, and London. Although policing and security hardware and 
technology continue to be primary security strategies, the incorporation of envi-
ronmental design and public education and user outreach programs has increased 
substantially since September 11th. Agencies continue to struggle with the conun-
drum central to transit security planning—eﬀectively securing their systems 
while keeping the system running eﬃciently. In this regard, transit operators are 
constantly assessing their security options and understanding the ways in which 
system security can help or hinder ridership.
One of the important developments in transit security is the amount of coop-
eration that appears to be occurring among federal, national, and local agencies. 
Federal interviewees were unanimous in their view that relatively little in the way 
of “turf battles” was occurring as agencies juggle their evolving and, in some cases, 
newly acquired roles and responsibilities. The contributions of non-governmental 
industry organizations, particularly APTA, deserve special mention in this regard. 
APTA has assisted each of the organizations mentioned in this paper in a variety 
of ways, including cooperation in the development of the PT-ISAC, which facili-
tates the sharing of security-related information among transit and government 
agencies. APTA and transit operators in the U.S. also seem eager to foster these 
relationships both in the domestic and international contexts. As to the ultimate 
eﬀectiveness of these many eﬀorts to increase transit system security, only time 
will tell.
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Appendix—List of Interviews
Hull, Greg. Interview by Camille Fink. American Public Transportation Association, 
Washington, D.C., 14 January 2004. 
Morange, William. Interview by Ellen Cavanagh. Metropolitan Transportation 
Authority, New York, NY, 4 June 2004.
O’Connor, John. Interview by Ellen Cavanagh. Amtrak Police Department, Penn 
Station, New York, NY, 1 June 2004.
The interviews of security oﬃcials at two other transit agencies informed the ﬁnd-
ings reported here, but the identities of the people interviewed, their organiza-
tions, and any agency-speciﬁc information from these interviews are not reported 
here to honor their requests for anonymity. 
End Notes
1Both the interview and survey data are drawn from a larger transit security study 
entitled “Designing and Operating Safe and Secure Transit Systems: Assessing Cur-
rent Practices in the U.S. and Abroad” undertaken by the paper’s authors and a 
group of other researchers at UCLA, UC Berkeley, and San Jose State University.
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